THE Siang Upper Multipurpose Project (SUMP) has naturally emerged as a serious concern for the indigenous communities of the Upper Siang, Siang, and East Siang districts of Arunachal Pradesh. Conceived in 2008 as India’s largest hydropower project, the 11,200 MW project, proposed across three districts of the Siang Valley, is now being projected as a strategic countermeasure to China’s similar plans upstream. The proposed mega-dam, estimated to have a storage capacity of approximately 9.2 billion cubic metres, has encountered strong opposition from several organisations, including Adi Banne Kebang–United, the Siang Indigenous Farmers Forum, and the Adi Galo Welfare Society. These groups fear that the dam could submerge 27 villages and displace 1.5 lakh people, in addition to inundating vast tracts of fertile paddy fields along the river. Beyond the legitimate concern for safeguarding ancestral land, resistance to the proposed dam has also raised serious questions about the protection of cultural heritage, traditional livelihoods, and the food security of the indigenous communities of the valley. Ignoring the growing intensity of the protests, the Arunachal Pradesh State Cabinet, on September 23, 2026, adopted a resolution approving the constitution of an Empowered High-Level Committee “to guide and coordinate” the pre-feasibility report survey and associated activities for the proposed Siang Upper Multipurpose Project.

While the people, through their peaceful movement, demanded transparency and accountability from the state government, as well as a viable plan for the resettlement and rehabilitation of the affected villages, the government resorted to manipulative tactics rather than offering any convincing solutions. Steps were reportedly taken to strengthen a pro-dam lobby in the villages, particularly by involving village heads, panchayat leaders and government officials. The attempt to ‘manufacture’ public consent was accompanied by the adoption of coercive measures and the characterisation of those opposing the dam as ‘anti-national’, ‘anti-social’, and ‘anti-development’—a strategy commonly employed by BJP governments to delegitimise dissent. Concomitantly, the government deployed paramilitary forces at various locations across all three districts to suppress the voices of indigenous people opposing the pre-feasibility surveys. Consequently, tensions surrounding the peaceful movement escalated into violence in Pasighat on the night of October 23, when some protesters allegedly set fire to a police station, an NHPC office, and police vehicles, besides vandalising the residences of political leaders.

TAMING THE BRAHMAPUTRA

As a potential mechanism for controlling the perennial flooding of the Brahmaputra, a large dam on the Subansiri, a tributary of the Brahmaputra, was first envisaged by the Government of Assam in the mid-1950s. The idea took the shape of a concrete proposal in 1982 when the Brahmaputra Board, a statutory body established under an Act of Parliament in 1980, formulated a project plan. However, the proposal not only failed to attract investment but also encountered stiff opposition because of its potential ecological impacts and the submergence of land. The prevailing political environment favoured small- and micro-hydropower projects to meet local energy requirements.

Following political negotiations between the Brahmaputra Board and the Government of Arunachal Pradesh, headed by Gegong Apang, the original project was reassessed in the mid-1990s. The revised proposal formulated by the Brahmaputra Board envisaged breaking up the massive dam project into six smaller projects, three each on the Subansiri and Dibang rivers. The Gerukamukh site in the lower reaches of Subansiri was selected for the first project. In 2000, the Central Government directed the Brahmaputra Board to entrust the execution of the 2,000 MW project to the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC).

The Lower Subansiri Hydroelectric Project was followed by the 3,000 MW Dibang Multipurpose Project. Although the foundation stone of the latter was laid in 2008 by the then Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, the Union Cabinet approved the project in July 2019. Construction activities formally resumed following a fresh foundation-stone-laying ceremony on March 9, 2024, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

RESISTANCE BY PEOPLE

Both these projects have faced strong opposition from numerous organisations, including various political parties. The resistance, particularly against the Lower Subansiri project, has raised fundamental questions about the environmental sustainability of such mega-dam projects. Although the opposition was largely concentrated in the adjoining districts of Assam, the prolonged anti-dam movements brought into focus serious concerns regarding the adequacy of the project's environmental impact assessment, potential downstream flooding, riverbank erosion, seismic risks, biodiversity loss and the disruption of local livelihoods. Concurrently, some organisations also sought judicial intervention to challenge aspects of the project.

Although the prevailing politico-juridical environment favoured the construction of mega-dams, the state machinery and the project-executing authorities found it possible to gradually weaken the resistance of a movement that lacked a coherent ideological framework and sustained organisational support. The authorities pursued a developmentalist agenda under the guise of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to defuse the decade-long movement, which had also attracted considerable academic attention. Efforts to secure local support included assistance for piggery, sericulture and handloom enterprises, improvements in road infrastructure, rural electrification and the creation of local employment opportunities.

This quid pro quo approach helped facilitate the project's partial operationalisation. Nevertheless, the genuine concerns of the people, their anxieties about downstream impacts, and the uncertainties surrounding the project's ecological consequences have remained inadequately addressed. These anxieties have been reinforced by the recurring devastation associated with the Ranganadi Hydroelectric Project, which is considerably smaller than the Lower Subansiri Project. The experience of the Ranganadi dam has consequently intensified apprehensions about the potential downstream consequences of the much larger Subansiri project.

CORPORATE-STATE NEXUS

In addition to serving the interests of corporate houses, hydropower development has long been viewed by the government of Arunachal Pradesh as a business proposition. Following the finalisation of the Lower Subansiri Project, the government initiated its Hydropower Policy in November 2005, primarily involving private developers, with the aim of generating 57,000 MW of electricity. Subsequently, the government signed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with a large number of private and public sector companies. Reportedly, some private companies, despite lacking prior experience in hydropower development, secured projects by making upfront payments to the state exchequer. Such allegedly corrupt practices adopted by the state government inevitably raised questions about its prioritisation of financial gains at the expense of ecological sustainability.

The informed sections of Arunachal Pradesh's population must have taken cognisance of the inequitable design of the Government of India to transform the Northeast, particularly Arunachal Pradesh, into a hydropower hub—a strategy concretised in the plans of the Central Electricity Authority (CEA). The ‘Master Plan for Evacuation of Power from Hydroelectric Plants in the Brahmaputra Basin’, released in October 2025, provides a framework for transmitting up to 76 GW of electricity generated by hydropower and pumped-storage projects from one of India's most resource-rich river systems. The plan covers 208 large hydropower projects across 12 sub-basins, with a potential installed capacity of 64.9 GW, alongside an additional 11.1 GW from pumped-storage plants. Ostensibly, the plan aims to meet the country's growing electricity demand, with the total estimated investment in transmission infrastructure amounting to approximately ₹6.43 lakh crore. However, the plan's justification rests largely on the narratives of national security and economic development, while giving insufficient consideration to the seismic vulnerability of the basin, ecological consequences, and other pertinent socioeconomic concerns.

It is worth mentioning that the Siang Upper Multipurpose Project (SUMP) was initially planned in 2013 as two smaller projects: Siang Upper Stage I (6,000 MW) and Stage II (3,750 MW). Reportedly, on 26 September 2017, the plan was revised following negotiations between a delegation from Arunachal Pradesh, led by the Chief Minister, and representatives of the NITI Aayog. Consequently, the proposal was modified to construct a single, 250-metre-high dam with a greater generating capacity of 11,200 MW but at a 25 per cent lower cost. Given the relatively dense population of the Siang valley, the project's impact is expected to be considerably more severe and extensive than that of the other major hydropower projects being developed in the state, including those in the Subansiri and Dibang valleys.

As reported by The Hindu, the people of the Siang valley are neither persuaded by the government's argument that the project will generate revenue for the state nor convinced by the narrative of security threats arising from China's Medog dam project on the same river in Tibet. Their primary concern, however, is their own survival and their right to live with dignity while preserving their identity, traditions, and customs, as well as their customary rights over their land and the natural resources it sustains.

In the light of above, the present movement launched by the people of the Siang Valley cannot be understood simply as opposition to a hydropower project per se. Although the movement was triggered by pre-feasibility surveys and drilling associated with the Siang project, it is intrinsically linked to the traditional and customary rights of indigenous people over their ancestral lands, the ever-increasing distrust of the corporate logic of development and the national security narrative propagated by the neoliberal state, as well as accumulated environmental anxieties. To be precise, the present movement is, once again, challenging the logic of development instantiated by the corporate-state nexus.

STOP MEGA-DAMS

The management of water resources and associated river systems in Northeast India is undoubtedly an extremely complex issue that requires concerted efforts involving all the states of the region. The pertinent questions that extend beyond the technological paradigm must also be addressed, taking into account broader societal concerns. The ongoing discourse on unresolved issues of water management in the region underscores the growing need for the North-East Water Management Authority (NEWMA), an institutional mechanism first proposed in 2004 by the then Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh. It was envisioned as a robust, integrated body that would replace the Brahmaputra Board, which has long struggled with limited powers, fragmented jurisdiction, and weak coordination mechanisms.

The idea of NEWMA resurfaced in 2022, when the North-East Water Management Authority Bill was listed in Parliament but was never introduced. As envisaged, this institutional mechanism would fill the institutional void created by the Brahmaputra Board's ineffectiveness. It would not only have the authority to prepare and approve master plans but also ensure their implementation through adequate funding, clearly defined timelines, and effective inter-state coordination. In 2020, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Water Resources reiterated the need for such an institutional mechanism, and in 2023, the Union Minister for Jal Shakti also underscored its urgency. The proposal, however, has yet to be translated into concrete action.

In the given situation, the union government and the government of Arunachal Pradesh must refrain from proceeding with the proposed mega-dam projects in the region until a comprehensive impact assessment of all proposed projects has been undertaken and its findings made available in the public domain for public scrutiny.