EVER since the end of World War II, the United States – along with the former colonial powers of the region, Britain and France – dominated the region of West Asia from the Mediterranean Sea to the Hindu Kush mountains. With the emergence of the region as a major producer of oil and natural gas – the fuel of the modern industrial era – the United States invested resources to build a web of military bases and to work with its NATO allies to ensure that no regime cement its rule that would seek to promote national sovereignty over the oil system (the first coup, against the government of Mohammed Mossadeq in Iran in 1953, is indicative of this attitude). From its founding, Israel operated as the subcontractor of Western power in West Asia and as the British withdrew from Kuwait, Qatar, the Trucial Sheikhdoms (now United Arab Emirates), Oman, and Yemen, the United States set up military bases to resume Western control of the oil waters. This order, managed by the United States with its Western allies (including Israel), lasted till the war of aggression against Iran by Israel and the United States this year. Iran’s ability to withstand the assault has led to anxiety about that order.

In reaction, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan met to form the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, which is one of the first attempts in West Asia to build a security platform that does not include the United States or other Western powers. This comes since Iran’s strikes on the US military bases has led to a debate in Arabia about the need to remove these bases since they are more a target than a shield. Now that US troops have formally withdrawn from Iraq, it is likely that Iraq will join this Agreement and that the smaller states on the Arabian Peninsula might enter the protocols. It is this new architecture that has led to the increased feeling that Israel will be isolated in the region, and therefore impacted the forthcoming Israeli elections and the behaviour of its current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

ISRAELI SHENANIGANS

Israel approaches its parliamentary election on 27 October while the destruction of Palestinian life continues. The UN’s independent commission of inquiry concluded in September 2025 that Israel had committed genocide in Gaza. The machinery of dispossession outlasts individual military operations, since it destroys the conditions under which a people can live and reproduce their society. Yet the Israeli campaign turns repeatedly towards who can best guarantee Israeli security. That contradiction reaches beyond the ballot box. Israel is trying to preserve its regional position as the security architecture built around US power becomes increasingly uncertain. Both candidates for the top office – Netanyahu and Gadi Eisenkot – are united on the need for Israel to use any and every power to maintain its position in the region.

The dispute over an Emirati warning before 7 October 2023 exposes this larger problem. An investigation by Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval, published by Haaretz on 8 September, alleged that UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed warned Netanyahu roughly ten days before the Hamas attack. According to the investigation, bin Zayed described a major operation being prepared by Yahya Sinwar of Hamas. Netanyahu allegedly discounted the warning and failed to convey it to senior security officials. His office denies both the conversation and the warning.

Netanyahu’s late September journey to Abu Dhabi brought the controversy into regional diplomacy. The Associated Press reported that during his visit Netanyahu asked bin Zayed to deny the warning publicly. The Emirati authorities supplied no such public denial. Instead, their foreign ministry reiterated that it maintained direct communications with Israel and shared relevant intelligence. Silence does not establish the truth of Haaretz’s account. It does, however, leave Netanyahu without the public vindication he reportedly sought from an important Arab partner.

Then came the incident aboard Flydubai flight FZ1073 on 30 September. The aircraft, travelling from Dubai to Tel Aviv, diverted to Tabuk in Saudi Arabia after an alleged assault by the co-pilot on the captain. Reports described an abrupt descent and intervention by passengers and crew. The unusual feature was that the alleged threat originated inside the cockpit, from someone entrusted with flying the aircraft. The precise sequence, motive and possible connections remain matters for investigators.

The election campaign did not wait. Defence Minister Israel Katz hastily said that Netanyahu’s earlier warning of possible attacks before polling day was linked to this incident. Netanyahu’s supporters sought to convert the emergency into confirmation of his vigilance, while opponents challenged that interpretation. The political message was recognisable: danger makes the incumbent indispensable. But a general prediction of danger cannot substitute for answering questions about warnings allegedly ignored.

The timing is striking, but temporal proximity supplies no evidence that the incident was staged or connected to Netanyahu’s UAE visit. The connection that can be analysed is political and institutional. A commercial route created by normalisation became the scene of an emergency requiring cooperation across states with different diplomatic relationships. Israeli passengers landed safely in Saudi Arabia, which has no formal relations with Israel. In practical terms, regional security already depends on arrangements more complicated than the division between recognised allies and declared adversaries.

ABRAHAM ACCORDS

The UAE–Israel relationship has developed through precisely such contradictions. Before formal normalisation, limited contacts existed within international institutions. In 2015 an Israeli delegation visited the Abu Dhabi headquarters of the International Renewable Energy Agency. The UAE insisted that dealings involving the agency did not change its position towards Israel. That distinction allowed contact while preserving diplomatic distance. The Abraham Accords established diplomatic relations in September 2020, followed by embassies in 2021, and then trade, tourism, and investment. A Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement was signed in May 2022, with a customs agreement enabling its implementation in 2023. Normalisation created material interests, business networks, and regular travel. It also demonstrated that an Arab government could expand relations with Israel without first securing Palestinian freedom.

This was embedded in a US design. The 2020 treaty explicitly envisaged Israel and the UAE joining the United States in developing a regional strategic agenda. Its political logic was to integrate Israel into its surroundings while leaving the Palestinian question unresolved. Today, the same partnership faces a different question: how much protection can US sponsorship reliably provide? Israel and the UAE have incentives to preserve cooperation, but their interests are not identical. Abu Dhabi’s regional calculations cannot be reduced to Netanyahu’s electoral needs.

WINDS OF CHANGE

Iraq supplies the clearest recent sign of change. Washington announced the completion of its troop withdrawal on 30 September, implementing the timetable negotiated with Baghdad in 2024. Celebrations in Baghdad marked a powerful assertion of sovereignty. For a country devastated by the illegal 2003 invasion and its aftermath, the departure carries an unavoidable historical weight. It undermines the assumption that US troops must remain indefinitely as the indispensable organisers of Iraqi security.

The celebrations should not obscure the contested meaning of withdrawal. One of the major paramilitary groups, Kataib Hezbollah. challenged official claims of a complete departure, alleging continuing US military and surveillance flights and personnel movements. Even if this is true, it is equally true that the US has lessened its footprint in Iraq and the Iraqi people have welcomed this step towards their full exit.

A second development is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan on 7 August. The Agreement has a collective defence commitment and does not include the United States. The pact combines Saudi financial resources, Turkish defence-industrial capabilities, and Pakistani military experience. It establishes a regional framework through which these governments can seek protection without making Washington the formal centre of the arrangement. Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons does not establish that the agreement supplies a nuclear guarantee. Nor does Turkey’s participation erase its NATO membership or the signatories’ existing Western relationships. Their officials describe the pact as defensive and reject a sectarian interpretation. It is best understood as an effort to diversify security options, whose effectiveness remains to be demonstrated.

Taken together, Iraq and Mecca suggest a redistribution of security responsibilities. This is not yet a West Asia without the United States. Washington retains influence through military partnerships, arms, intelligence, and deployments elsewhere. Withdrawal from Iraq should not be mistaken for withdrawal from the entire region. What is changing is the confidence that US power can provide a stable, sufficient guarantee. Regional governments are building alternatives, sometimes alongside their US connections, sometimes beyond them.

REACTION FROM ISRAEL

Israel faces a security dilemma. The old architecture of US military dominance in the region, which provided Israel with the blanket of arrogance to continue its apartheid-genocide regime against the Palestinians, is now breaking down. US military bases will be shuttered, US power will no longer be thought of as invincible. The experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq – where the US could not eventually prevail – Libya – which the US and France with their Gulf Arab allies destroyed – and now Iran – where the US has been defeated strategically – show that the US can destroy things, but it cannot control countries. What will Israel do without its major ally (the US) and its minor allies (the Europeans) if they will reduce their footprint in the region. Having secured the oil in Venezuela and seeking to dominate the oil in Brazil, the US has hedged its bets against the loss of control over the oil in West Asia. That will not motivate Trump to continue conflicts that are unwinnable.

So, Israel has turned to its closest Abraham Accords partner, the UAE, but President Mohamed bin Zayed will face his own problems if he gets too close to Israel. Which is perhaps why he did not give Netanyahu the denial that he sought for the election. But nonetheless an enduring Emirati relationship offers Israel economic access and diplomatic relevance. This is a cooperation filled with risk for the UAE.

The election, the warning controversy, and the aviation emergency belong within the wider security transition. Netanyahu seeks to renew a personal claim to security authority, while Israel seeks to maintain its place in a changing regional order. The UAE is pursuing its own position within that order, while Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan construct another framework. For progressive forces, the essential test is whose security these arrangements serve. An architecture that protects governments, investment, and strategic routes while accepting the permanent destruction of Palestinian life cannot deliver peace. Regional autonomy must become inseparable from Palestinian freedom and popular sovereignty.